Hyman, Timothy. Carnivalesque. London: Hayward Gallery Publishing, 2000.
A historical account of the carnivalesque in art, mostly more concerned with the grotesque than the humourous per se. Addresses the historical role of the carnival, and its relation to art through a series of painters from the 16th century to the present day. Mostly concerned with carnivalesque themes such as crowds, masks, bodies and inversion. Lots of pictures of genetalia interpreted through Bahktin with a predominantly formal concern, though many of the paintings are argued to convey political messages (though not have political effects as it were).
A companion essay by Roger Malbert is more scpetical as regards the political function of the carnival in his treatment of contemporary art. Argues that the carnival loses something of its essence when it passes from lived exprience to text, but that it also gains the ability to capture the fleeting and thereby confront the viewer with the world. Anthony Howell and Paul McCarthy are perhaps the most interesting examples.
Showing posts with label British. Show all posts
Showing posts with label British. Show all posts
Saturday, June 5, 2010
Tuesday, May 4, 2010
Gray, Jonathan, Jeffrey Jones and Ethan Thompson. Satire TV: Politics and Comedy in the Post-Network Era
Gray, Jonathan, Jeffrey Jones and Ethan Thompson. Satire TV: Politics and Comedy in the Post-Network Era. New York, NY: New York University Press, 2009.
An account of contemporary satirical TV shows - including The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, South Park, SNL, Dave Chappelle, Sacha Baron Cohen and Chris Morris - which provides useful descriptive and historical content. Theoretically bound to Bahktin via Crichtley school of humour theory, however, which leads to unsophisticated celebrations of subversive and critical power of satire as political force. Useful categorisations of terminology, but reductive critical political analysis leads to premature conclusions.
An account of contemporary satirical TV shows - including The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, South Park, SNL, Dave Chappelle, Sacha Baron Cohen and Chris Morris - which provides useful descriptive and historical content. Theoretically bound to Bahktin via Crichtley school of humour theory, however, which leads to unsophisticated celebrations of subversive and critical power of satire as political force. Useful categorisations of terminology, but reductive critical political analysis leads to premature conclusions.
Hobbes, Thomas. The elements of law, natural and politic
Hobbes, Thomas. The elements of law, natural and politic: part I, Human Nature, part II, De corpore politico ; with Three lives. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Regarded as one of the founding texts of the Superiority tradition of humour theory, wherein Thomas Hobbes asserts that “the passion of laughter is nothing else but a sudden glory arising from the sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmities of others, or with our own formerly” (54). Thus, humour is a respose to perceived superiority in relation to another, or in respect to one's past self. This perception must be both new and sudden. Like many early writers (and several contemporary ones as well) Hobbes collapses any distinction between humour and laughter. Less often noted is that Hobbes also leaves open the possibility of non-mocking laughter, declaring that: "Laughter without offence, must be at absurdities and infirmities abstracted from persons, and where all the company may laugh together” (55).
Regarded as one of the founding texts of the Superiority tradition of humour theory, wherein Thomas Hobbes asserts that “the passion of laughter is nothing else but a sudden glory arising from the sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmities of others, or with our own formerly” (54). Thus, humour is a respose to perceived superiority in relation to another, or in respect to one's past self. This perception must be both new and sudden. Like many early writers (and several contemporary ones as well) Hobbes collapses any distinction between humour and laughter. Less often noted is that Hobbes also leaves open the possibility of non-mocking laughter, declaring that: "Laughter without offence, must be at absurdities and infirmities abstracted from persons, and where all the company may laugh together” (55).
Billig, Michael. Laughter and Ridicule: Towards a Social Critique of Humour
Billig, Michael. Laughter and Ridicule: Towards a Social Critique of Humour. London: Sage, 2005.
Billig offers a fairly comprehensive historical account of the key texts of humour theory from a perspective directly at odds with that offered by conventional "humor studies." Billig goes perhaps too far in the opposite direction though, declaring all humour to be an act of aggressive social control and power with the aim to humiliate and discipline its subject (194-9). In Billig's account, humour is cruel and dominating, and he therefore can function as a useful illustration of a particular anlytic extreme.
Also useful is Billig's argument that humour has become a social obligation, and very little is now considered outside the purview of humour (11-5), such that humour should be considered a form of conformity, not rebellion. Moreover, Billig asserts that it is mistaken to make any distinction between positive and negative humour (22-5), such as those offered by Zupančič and Eco, and instead he argues that all humour is a rejection of negative and critical thinking that results in a conservative mindset (30). Such misunderstandings are argued to arise from an approach that treats humour as a cognitive and intellectual, rather than emotional, phenomenon, and which thereby abstracts humour out from the social conditions wherein it operates (64-6). Socially understood, laughter is never kind-hearted, it always arises out of a desire to ridicule and discipline (134-6). In political terms, this ridicule is always on the side of the powerful, and thus cannot constitute a rebellion of any sort: in fact, Billig asserts, any attempt to conjoin political dissent with humour, robs any radical or revolutionary action of its power (209-12). In these claims, Billig represents the other dominant strain of contemporary humour theory – opposed to the carnivalesque tradition – which regards humour as Adorno does pleasure, an acritical and disempowering force that, in addition, acts to sustain social discipline through humiliation: a profoundly conservative politics of humour. Billig thus rejects any distinction between carnivalesque positive and repressive negative humour because in his conception all humour is inherently tied into normative demonstrations of superiority and indifference for human life, and thus can only be used to reaffirm, not subvert, existing social power structures
Billig offers an interpretation that holds that the function of humour may be quite different from the humorist’s intention; thus, a joke that is intended to serve a subversive function may be revealed to function conservatively. This interpretation is supported through recourse to the Freudian notion of the “tendentious joke,” a form of humour that expresses hostile or obscene thoughts (Billig 154).
Billig offers a fairly comprehensive historical account of the key texts of humour theory from a perspective directly at odds with that offered by conventional "humor studies." Billig goes perhaps too far in the opposite direction though, declaring all humour to be an act of aggressive social control and power with the aim to humiliate and discipline its subject (194-9). In Billig's account, humour is cruel and dominating, and he therefore can function as a useful illustration of a particular anlytic extreme.
Also useful is Billig's argument that humour has become a social obligation, and very little is now considered outside the purview of humour (11-5), such that humour should be considered a form of conformity, not rebellion. Moreover, Billig asserts that it is mistaken to make any distinction between positive and negative humour (22-5), such as those offered by Zupančič and Eco, and instead he argues that all humour is a rejection of negative and critical thinking that results in a conservative mindset (30). Such misunderstandings are argued to arise from an approach that treats humour as a cognitive and intellectual, rather than emotional, phenomenon, and which thereby abstracts humour out from the social conditions wherein it operates (64-6). Socially understood, laughter is never kind-hearted, it always arises out of a desire to ridicule and discipline (134-6). In political terms, this ridicule is always on the side of the powerful, and thus cannot constitute a rebellion of any sort: in fact, Billig asserts, any attempt to conjoin political dissent with humour, robs any radical or revolutionary action of its power (209-12). In these claims, Billig represents the other dominant strain of contemporary humour theory – opposed to the carnivalesque tradition – which regards humour as Adorno does pleasure, an acritical and disempowering force that, in addition, acts to sustain social discipline through humiliation: a profoundly conservative politics of humour. Billig thus rejects any distinction between carnivalesque positive and repressive negative humour because in his conception all humour is inherently tied into normative demonstrations of superiority and indifference for human life, and thus can only be used to reaffirm, not subvert, existing social power structures
Billig offers an interpretation that holds that the function of humour may be quite different from the humorist’s intention; thus, a joke that is intended to serve a subversive function may be revealed to function conservatively. This interpretation is supported through recourse to the Freudian notion of the “tendentious joke,” a form of humour that expresses hostile or obscene thoughts (Billig 154).
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